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Abstract 
Globalization has underlined the need for firms to exploit technological capabilities on a global 
scale. This study attempts to make a comprehensive investigation of various factors influencing the 
choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing as a strategy for expansion 
abroad. To underpin our main research questions, we rely on different theoretical contributions 
which have variously emphasized the importance of cultural distance, learning, nature of technology 
and competition. Specifically, this paper addresses the following issues: -Does cultural distance 
influence the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing? - Do firms learn 
from previous business practices in foreign countries? - How does the presence of other sources of 
technological competencies affect the entry modal choice? We test our hypotheses using a novel 
and extremely comprehensive database on worldwide plant level investments in the chemical 
industry during the 1980s. After controlling, to our best, for the nature of the technology and for 
firm - and country- specific heterogeneity, we find that cultural distance and multiple sources of 
technological competencies favor the use of licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad, whereas, 
prior experience favor the choice of wholly owned subsidiary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the world globalizes, the imperatives firms face to exploit technological competencies on a 
global scale, rather than national, increase as well. Indeed, during the last decades firms have 
increasingly committed themselves to global markets. This has coincided with a surge in the 
worldwide flows of foreign direct investment which have grown at the annual rate of 12% 
between 1991 and 1996, reaching a global stock of $3200 billion in the year 1996 (World 
Bank, 1997). Similarly, cross-border licensing agreements have been a source of large profits 
in many industries (see for instance, Parr and Sullivan, 1996) and other forms of international 
expansion have become widespread in recent years. 
Both wholly owned subsidiaries and licensing contracts, along with exports and joint 
ventures are potential channels for the exploitation of technological competencies across 
national boundaries. The choice, however, is a critical determinant of the likely success of the 
foreign project (Root, 1987; Davidson, 1982; Killing, 1982). Understanding the factors that 
condition a finn's choice among the different alternatives is an important challenge in the 
field of international business studies. We follow in this tradition and focus specifically on 
whether technological competencies are exploited in foreign markets licensing agreements or 
wholly owned subsidiaries. These two alternatives lie at the extremes of a continuum of 
governance structures ranging from a hierarchy to a market mechanism (e.g., Williamson, 
1991). In the last part of the paper we extend our analysis to include joint ventures with local 
firms, an intermediate governance structure. 
Despite the considerable body of theoretical work both by business theorists and 
economists (see literature review in section 2), there are relatively few empirical studies that 
address this topic is a comprehensive way. (Contractor and Kundu, 1998, is a recent 
exception.) Typically, the empirical research has focused on the internationalization 
strategies of a restricted sample of firms, most of the times of the same nationality, and 
addressed separately the different implications emerging from the theory. One obvious 
justification for this lack of comprehensive empirical studies is the difficulty in collecting 
data. Our research uses data on investment projects in the chemical industry worldwide. This 
is a new and rich database that has not been explored in previous studies of entry modal 
choice. Although limited to one sector, it has the virtue of being comprehensive, covering the 
universe of projects undertaken all over the world for a large number of years. This allows us 
to test simultaneously different theoretical contributions on the entry modal choice and 
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control for many sources of heterogeneity. In addition, the chemical industry constitutes a 
natural test-bed for analyzing these issues because it is both a technology-based industry and 
truly global industry.] 
We use our data to address the following research questions. First, does cultural 
distance influence the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing? 
Contractor and Kundu (1998), using data on the worldwide hotel industry, have found no 
effect of cultural distance. However, other studies (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema, 
Bell and Pennings, 1996; Hannart and Larimo, 1998), although focusing on different entry 
modes, report that cultural barriers are important in shaping international expansion strategies. 
Second, do firms learn from previous business practices in foreign countries? The 
literature suggests that multinational firms through past experience are able to reduce entry 
barriers, both in terms of cultural distance (Hofstede, 1991), knowledge of business routines 
abroad (Ermanilli and Rao, 1993) and bargaining position vis-a-vis local governments 
(Lecraw, 1984). This study tests whether this learning contributes substantially in reducing 
entry costs and therefore in making wholly owned subsidiary more likely. Contractor and 
Kundu (1998) find that equity-based modes are preferred by companies with considerable 
experience and existing geographic reach. However, Benito and Gripsrud (1992) reject the 
hypothesis that current levels of direct investment in culturally remote countries will increase 
with previous levels of foreign direct investment. We also test if some forms of entry provide 
to the investor more experience than others. 
Third, how does the presence of other sources of technological competencies influence 
the entry modal choice? Although even simple strategy theory implies that a firm's strategy 
cannot be worked out in isolation, studies of entry modes in foreign markets have largely 
ignored this basic point. However, it is likely that when the technological competencies the 
firm possesses are not unique, i.e., when there exists a market for technology (Arora, Fosfuri 
and Gambardella, 1999), the strategic imperatives conditioning the choice between wholly 
owned subsidiary and licensing differ from the imperatives when the firm possesses unique 
and "difficult to replicate" technological capabilities. Further, since the presence of 
alternative sources of technological competencies might simply be a proxy for more 
fundamental attributes of the technology (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Arora and Gambardella, 
1994), in our empirical analysis we shall control for characteristics of the technology such as 
codifiability and complexity. 
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BACKGROUND 
About forty years ago, Hymer (1960), in his doctoral dissertation, wondered why 
multinational firms existed at all in face of presumed penalties for operating across national 
and cultural boundaries. There are obvious added costs of doing business in another country, 
including communications and transport costs, higher costs of stationing personnel abroad, 
barriers due to language, customs, and being outside the local business and government 
network. The logic put forward by Hymer still remains persuasive: the multinational must 
bring some inherent advantages that potentially constitute an important edge over local 
competitors. The principal belief of the theory of foreign direct investment is that the primary 
advantage that a firm brings to foreign markets is its possession of superior knowledge, 
whether it be the knowledge underlying technology, production, marketing or other activities. 
Initially, the research was focused on understanding why the firm needed to locate in the 
foreign markets vIs-a-vis producing at home and supplying the foreign locations through 
exports. Indeed, much of the early literature on the entry modal choice primarily addressed 
the decision between exporting and foreign direct investment (Caves, 1971; Rugman, 1981; 
Root, 1987). 
Although, "locational" considerations, such as tariffs, transport costs or comparative 
advantages, could mandate that the firm not concentrate all operations in one country and 
export to others, it still remained to explain why foreign direct investment should be preferred 
to the arm's length use of markets. The "eclectic theory" developed by Dunning (1981) and 
formalized by Buckley ~nd Casson (1981), pointed to "internalization" advantages (see for a 
generalization, Buckley and Casson, 1998). Applying the insights of the transaction cost 
theory (Williamson, 1991), this approach suggests that, absent significant contracting hazards, 
the 'default' low-cost governance mechanism is a simple contract. Put it differently, in a 
world without transaction costs, an arm's length contract such as licensing would be the most 
direct way to capture the profit from the intellectual asset (such as a process or an idea) a firm 
holds. The licensing fees ought to match the profits the firm could make by producing 
locally. However, writing and executing a reliable contract for the use of technology requires 
adequate specification of property rights, monitoring and enforcement of contractual terms -
any of which may be problematic (Contractor, 1981; Teece, 1988). In turn, this might also 
increase the potential for leakage of valuable intellectual property (Fosfuri, 1999). Caves, 
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Crookell and Killing (1983) find that, due to imperfections in the licensing market, licensors 
capture only about a third of the rents from the ilIDovation. 
An interesting twist to this approach is provided by Kogut and Zander (1992) and Arora 
and Gambardella (1994). They point out that the reason why one may not see market-based 
transactions in technologies cannot ascribed solely to the classical market failure argument. 
There are cognitive aspects to be taken into account. Specifically the fact that knowledge or 
technologies are embedded into organizational routines provides a serious constraint to the 
choice of transferring them to other agents. In a related work, Kogut and Zander (1993) argue 
that "multinational corporations arise not out of the failure of markets for buying and selling 
knowledge, but out of its superior efficiency as an organizational vehicle by which to transfer 
this knowledge across borders". Although theoretically different, their approach leads to 
conclusions and implications that are empirically equivalent to the ones generated by the 
transaction cost theory. Indeed, they posit that the nature of the knowledge, or technology, is 
the main determinant of the choice of the mode of international expansion. If the knowledge 
is tacit, complex and difficult to teach then - they argue - intra-firm transfers of knowledge 
are easier than inter-firm transfers. However, it is exactly when the knowledge is tacit and 
complex that contracting upon it becomes more problematic and transaction costs are the 
largest (Arrow, 1962; Teece, 1977; Williamson, 1991). 
A second piece of theory that we shall appeal to in developing our hypotheses is based 
on the behavioral theory of the firm. This approach adds to the picture a dynamic component. 
The idea is that firms stay close to their past practices and routines (Cyert and March, 1963) 
and therefore the process of internationalization can only be gradual and sequential. Firms 
operating internationally face a large amount of uncertainty, to which they answer with a 
stage by stage strategy. Elaborating on this approach, the Uppsala school maintains that in 
this slow process of sequential steps the firm oriented towards globalization learns habits, 
preferences, and the market structure of the target countries (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
This knowledge is a critical resource since the knowledge needed to operate in any country 
cannot easily be acquired. The more the firm learns about the local conditions, the cheaper is 
the subsequent investment by the firm in that economy. A related aspect of the Uppsala 
school is that a firm moves to distant countries only after having established a presence in 
more proximate countries. Then the firm will gradually penetrate countries at a greater 
"psychic" distance, which is often associated with a greater geographic distance. 
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Finally, a more recent approach is provided by the "syncretic" theory of the entry modal 
choice. This approach, developed by Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990) and Contractor (1990), 
focuses on the different level of control, resource commitment and dissemination risk 
involved respectively in licensing and wholly owned subsidiaries (joint ventures are classified 
as an intermediate choice between these two extremes). Specifically, in the case of licensing, 
the control is transferred to the licensee in exchange for lump-sum payments and royalties, 
while in the case of wholly owned subsidiary, the firm retains the ultimate control of the most 
important strategic decisions concerning the foreign operation. As for the level of resource 
commitment, licensing requires limited dedicated assets for the licensor, apart from personnel 
involved in training licensees and subsequent monitoring, while in a wholly owned subsidiary 
the firm bears all the costs of opening up the affiliate and serving the foreign market. Finally, 
licensing implies a much larger risk that firm-specific advantages in know-how will be 
disseminated. It is not unusual for a former licensee to evolve into an aggressive competitor. 
This suggests that both strategic variables, environmental variables and transaction-specific 
variables can play a role in shaping the decision between licensing and wholly owned 
subsidiary. Consequently, in our empirical analysis we shall control for firm-, country- and 
technology-specific sources of variation. To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical 
study attempting to test the "syncretic" theory is Contractor and Kundu (1998). 
HYPOTHESES 
To underpin our research questions, we rely on the different theoretical contributions 
briefly reviewed in the previous section which have variously emphasized the importance of 
cultural distance, learning, nature of technology and competition. 
Cultural Distance 
The seminal work by Hofstede (1980) has shown the importance of cultural differences 
for the way business practices are conducted. Globalized firms need to know how to run 
businesses in the target country to exploit their technological advantages and competencies at 
full effect. The further is the distance in values, customs and behaviors between their home 
country and the host country, the more difficult is for foreign investors to successfully 
proceed in their process of internationalization. For instance, Hennart and Larimo (1998) 
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report that Japanese multinationals have had much senous problems than their Finnish 
counterparts in dealing with the role of women in business in their US-based subsidiaries. 
But as clearly stated by Hofstede (1991) the importance of cultural distance changes 
according to the way international businesses are organized. A wholly owned subsidiary 
requires the coordination of the foreign affiliate through the expatriate managers, who have to 
live and work following the foreign customs. This is precisely the same argument that Hymer 
raised (see section above) while wondering why multinational enterprises exist. Instead a 
licensing contract is much less demanding in terms of acculturation. The firm has no need to 
learn how to deal with suppliers or potential customers. The local licensee brings in this 
knowledge. Similarly the "syncretic" theory would predict that a greater cultural distance 
rises the risk of failure for the foreign operation, which in turn makes more likely a market-
based relationship. These observations lead to the following hypothesis: 
HI: Cultural distance reduces the propensity of a firm to set up a wholly owned 
subsidiary in a foreign country rather than using licensing to exploit some 
technological competencies. 
Learning through past experience 
Although we focus on the decision concerning a single production site, the process of 
penetration in a foreign country is by its true nature a dynamic process (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). Firms like human beings learn from past experiences. Firms that expand abroad are 
likely to acquire knowledge about foreign sites, including foreign culture, institutional 
characteristics, and other site-specific knowledge. This learning does not reduce the cultural 
distance between home and target country but certainly improves the firm experience in 
operating a business in a given foreign market (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Root, 
1987). In turn, this reduces the costs of starting-up a new venture in the same country in 
future years? In a slightly different perspective, knowledge of the foreign business 
environment reduces the risks associated with the international operation, which in turn - as 
predicted by the "syncretic" theory - makes the firm more willing to commit a larger amount 
of resources. Consequently, we can state the following hypothesis: 
H2: Past business experience in a given country increases the propensity of a firm 
to set up a wholly owned subsidiary rather than using licensing to exploit some 
teclmological competencies in the present. 
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It is plausible that the experiential learning accumulated through past projects in a 
country depends on the form of the project. Projects that involve a stronger linkage with the 
local context such as the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture with a local 
partner give to the firm a much more diverse and richer experience than a licensing 
arrangement. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firms accumulate more valuable experiential learning from wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures rather than from licensing contracts. 
Number of technology sources 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between market structure and 
multinational investments (Caves, 1982; Buckley and Casson, 1976). One stylized fact seems 
to emerge: foreign direct investments are more widespread in less competitive markets. This 
is also confirmed by the findings that multinational investments are largely targeted to 
differentiated and segmented industries where competition is less intense (Grubaugh, 1987; 
Mork and Yeung, 1991). One explanation to this pattern seems very plausible: since 
operating a business abroad is rather costly, firms are actually more willing to embark in an 
investment if there are prospects of large future profits. Under tough competition a licensing 
agreement economizes on the setup costs of starting operating across natural and cultural 
boundaries. 
This leads to an important consideration: the entry mode strategy cannot be analyzed in 
isolation from what other potential competitors do or might do. Unfortunately, little attention 
has been devoted to this point by scholars in the field of international business studies. A firm 
investing in a foreign country is concerned with the present value of the future flows of 
profits, which have to be larger than the entry costs. Future profits are related to potential 
entrants in the market. Rival firms (both local and international) might be attracted by the 
presence of profitable businesses and start entering the market. Obviously an entrant needs to 
have access to the technology in order to start the production. All else held equal, the more 
sources of technology there are, the easier is entry and more intense the competition. Put it 
differently, the presence of a well-established market for technology, where technologies can 
be bought and sold as any other economic good (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 1999), 
makes technology licensing by international investors more likely. 
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H4: The larger the number of sources of technological competencies the lower 
the propensity of a firm to set up a wholly owned subsidiary rather than using 
licensing to exploit its technology in a foreign market. 
Testing this hypothesis involves an important qualification. As Kogut and Zander 
(1993) have pointed out, firms are a more efficient vehicle for transferring technologies that 
are complex, tacit and difficult to teach, while market-based transactions in technology are 
more likely to occur when technologies are more codified and easier to transfer across 
organizational boundaries. This means that the number of sources of technological 
competencies might simply be a proxy of some more fundamental attributes of technology. 
Accordingly, in our empirical analysis below, we control for characteristics of the technology 
such as complexity and codifiability to sort out the confounding effects. 
METHODOLOGY 
The unit of analysis of this study is an individual project undertaken into a foreign 
market between 1981 and 1991. Our sample includes all the largest chemical firms (in terms 
of their total turnover by the year 1988) which have at least one investment project during the 
1980s in our database. This constitutes a set of 153 chemical firms that, by and large, are all 
the most important chemical firms from developed countries, accounting for overseas 
investment of more than $50 billion a year during the period under study. 3, 4 
Our data on chemical projects undertaken abroad come from the Chemical Age Project 
File (CAPF), which covers all new chemical plants (over 20000) announced all over the 
world during 1981-199l. In addition to its novelty, this database is also comprehensive - it 
covers all chemical plants constructed or under construction anywhere in the world during the 
time period. The database contains the name of the company that operates the plant (or the 
names of the partners if the project is run under ajoint venture) and that of the firm that have 
licensed the technology. In addition, it provides information on the location (country and 
region), the technology used and, for a smaller number of observations, capacity and costs. 
For the purpose of the present study, these data allow us to identify whether, for a given 
project abroad, the firm that ultimately possessed the technological capability, has chosen to 
set up a fully owned operation or to adopt a licensing strategy. 
To clarify the terminology, we shall label "wholly owned project" a plant operated by 
only one firm, whereas we shall use 'joint venture" to identify a plant operated by more than 
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one firm. In the latter case our database does not give us more details about the governance 
structure, hence joint venture might be a mixture of different cases. 
In the econometric analysis below, we exploit the time dimension of the data and split 
the investment projects in two periods: 1981-1985 and 1986-1991. We run our regressions 
only on projects undertaken in the second period and use the first period observations to 
construct some of the independent variables (see below). This allows us to control better for 
other factors that affect the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and licensing, avoiding 
potential endogeneity problems. In most of our model specifications, we restrict our set of 
projects undertaken abroad to the ones belonging to a sample of 136 process technologies. 
These are the most important process technologies in chemicals and cover about 75% of all 
projects undertaken abroad. Although some bias might be introduced by restricting the 
sample of process technologies, the obvious advantage in terms of robustness of our results is 
that we can control for the nature of technology and other technology-specific sources of 
variation. 
Variables 
Mode ofenrry. We identify as wholly owned projects all plants abroad for which any of 
the firms of our sample is the exclusive owner. We classify as licensing all investment 
projects reporting any of the finns of our sample as the licensor of the technology. We 
capture this dichotomy in the entry mode through a binomial dependent variable that takes the 
value of 1 in case of wholly owned project and the value of 0 in case of licensing. 
Table 1 reports the number of projects (either wholly owned projects and technology 
licensing) undertaken into foreign markets by the firms of our sample during the period under 
study, by region. The table shows that the non-Japanese firms in our sample were more likely 
to use licensing than a wholly owned project when entering the Japanese market, while the 
reverse is true for Western Europe and North America. The developed regions as a whole 
(North America, Western Europe and Japan) account for more than two thirds of all wholly 
owned projects set up by the firms of the sample, but only a third of total licensed projects. 
Further, the firms in our sample when entering foreign markets in the developed countries 
have a higher propensity to internalize (henceforth PI) defined as the ratio between the 
number of wholly owned projects and the Sl.}m of licensed and wholly owned projects. An 
increase in this ratio means that firms tend to prefer internal organization vis-a-vis market 
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transactions for the exploitation of their technological competencies abroad. For developed 
regions the PI is close to 0.80 compared to less than 0.45 for the rest. In other words, the 
leading chemical firms are more likely to use wholly owned ventures vis-it-vis technology 
licensing for projects undertaken in developed countries than in developing countries, with 
Japan being somewhat of an outlier among developed countries. 
Cultural distance. (CULTDIST) We measure the cultural distance between the host and 
the target country using the four cultural dimension classification developed by Hofstede 
(1980, 1991). We construct an index that captures for the cultural distance along the four 
dimensions. This index has been initially used by Kogut and Singh (1988) and later in many 
other studies of foreign entry (e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart and Larimo, 
1998; Benito and Gripsrud, 1992). For a given country-pair, the cultural distance is 
calculated as the arithmetic average of the deviations in the Hofstede's four dimensions, 
correcting for the overall variance of each of these four dimensions. Since this measure is 
unavailable for China, we use a dummy (DUMCHN) to account for this. 
Experience. We use two separate measures of experience to capture for differences in 
the experiential learning accumulated through the different investment modes chosen for the 
foreign projects. EXP ALL measures experience as the total number of projects (of whatever 
type) in a given country in the five years preceding the project under study. EXPFDI only 
counts the projects which involve some forms of direct investment in the foreign country, 
either wholly owned projects or projects operated jointly with local firms. Although not 
reported here, using different time spans for measuring experience yields similar qualitative 
results. 
Potential licensors. (POTLIC) The number of potential licensors (i.e., sources of 
technological competencies) is measured by counting all firms (but the investor) that had 
actively licensed a given technology in the period 1981-1985. This constitutes a proxy both 
for the number of potential licensors in the period 1986-1991 and for the present and future 
market structure in the host country. However, it is plausible to posit that the effect of the 
presence of potential licensors is not linear. Adding an additional competitor to an already 
crowded market will not increase competition by much. On the other hand, there is a 
dramatic change in the profitability when an incumbent monopolist is threatened by an 
entrant, or incumbent duopolists are faced with another competitor. In other words, we 
expect the effect of an increase in the number of potential licensors to be initially quite strong 
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and then progressively less important as the number of potential licensors increases (see also 
Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). To capture this decreasing effect we use the logarithm of the 
number of potential licensors (LPOTLIC). We have also tried a quadratic term with similar 
qualitative results. 
Control Variables 
Geographic distance. (PROXIMITY) We use a dummy variable to capture the 
geographic proximity between home and host country. The variable takes the value of 1 
when the project undertaken abroad is in a country that shares some common borders with the 
home country or it is located within a 100 mile range. The variable takes the value of zero 
otherwise. Communication costs between the foreign operation and the headquarters, which 
are increasing with geographic distance, would suggest a positive effect of this variable on the 
propensity to set up a wholly owned project. 
Language. (LANGUAGE) This dummy takes the value of 1 if the home and the host 
country have at least one of their official languages in common and 0 otherwise. Having the 
same language might imply reduced communication costs between the foreign operations and 
the headquarters. It might also imply an easier adaptation process for the expatriates who are 
sent abroad. In sum, we expect this dummy to affect positively the propensity of a firm to set 
up a wholly owned project rather than licensing. 
Firm size. (SIZE) Although our sample is biased towards large firms, we control for 
firm size because investments abroad require large financial and managerial resources. Small 
firms, which lack the resources and expertise to venture into foreign markets, might find 
easier to license their technology and when they grow larger they might eventually shift to a 
network of subsidiaries (see for instance, Ermanilli and Rao, 1993). In other studies the 
evidence is mixed. Gomes-Casseres (1989) finds that larger firms prefer high levels of equity 
ownership, whereas Contractor and Kundu (1998) find the opposite. 
Market size. (GDP) The size of the foreign market can actually influence the 
profitability of the investment and therefore the mode of entry in the foreign country (see for 
instance, Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Shane, 1993; Zejan, 1990). We use the Barro-Lee database 
(a widely used source of country level data) to obtain information about the level of GDP in 
the host countries. GDP has two conflicting effects on the choice between wholly owned 
project and licensing. On the one hand, a small market may not be worth the effort, 
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particularly since any learning is likely to have only limited applicability. On the other hand, 
a large market may also be more competitive, implying that licensing may be a more 
attractive strategy. Also, a larger market may imply a greater possibility of more suitable 
potential licensees, an important consideration for the licensing strategy, particularly for 
developing country markets (e.g., Contractor, 1981; Arora, 1996). 
Tar(/fs on intermediate inputs and capital goods. (OWTI) The existence of restrictions 
to both capital investments and trade of inputs might reduce the profitability of a direct 
investment in the foreign country (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Although many 
countries take part to international trade agreements, there are still considerable differences in 
countries' openness towards investments and trade. To capture this difference we use the 
level of tariffs on capital investments and intermediate inputs, from the Barro-Lee database. 
Country risk. (NORISK) The larger the level of uncertainty in the returns from the 
project undertaken abroad, the less willing the finn to commit resources (Kim and Hwang, 
1992; Buckley and Casson, 1998). This would suggest that countries characterized by higher 
level of risk should attract relatively less wholly owned projects and more licensing. We use 
a measure of country risk developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The 
ICRG compiles monthly data on a variety of political, financial and economic risk factors (see 
for more details Erb, Harvey and Viskanta, 1996). Our measure of risk is a weighted average 
of the political, financial and economic risk. For the interpretation of the sign, one should be 
aware that a higher value of this variable is associated with less risk in the country. In other 
words, we expect the variable to have a positive sign on the probability to set up a wholly 
owned project as expansion strategy abroad. 
Core technology. (CORE) This is a dummy which takes the value of 1 when the 
technology is a core technology and 0 otherwise. Core technologies are defined as 
technologies in which the firm concentrates a large share (more than 20%) of its total 
investment in the home country. We expect that firms are less willing to license technologies 
in the core business, because of the greater danger from potential competitors. 
Codifiable technology. (CODIFIABILITY) We measure the degree of codifiability of 
the technology using the number of patents reported for that technology at the US Patent 
Office in a large number of years (1976-1991). As several authors have noted (e.g., David, 
1993; Arora, 1997), patents are more likely to be issued for technologies where the underlying 
knowledge is sufficiently codifiable. As suggested by Kogut and Zander (1993) and Arora 
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and Gambardella (1994), codifiability of the underlying knowledge base reduces the direct 
costs of information exchange across firm boundaries that a licensing agreement would entail. 
Patent data are organized in patent classes that are typically much coarser than the level of a 
single chemical process. Therefore, we had to develop a set of queries for collecting the 
number of patents on the 136 chemical process technologies in our sample from the online US 
Patent Office database.s We have standardized this variable to take values between 0 (not 
codifiable) and 1 (codifiable). 6 
Complex technology. (COMPLEXITY) As defined by Kogut and Zander "complexity is 
the number of critical and interacting elements embraced by an entity or activity". We use the 
number of patents on uses, inputs, components and applications of a given technology as a 
measure of the complexity of the technology itself. This variable was constructed through a 
careful process that involved reading the patent abstracts and constructing queries to search 
the US Patent Office online database (see footnote 5). We have standardized this variable to 
take values between 0 (simple) and 1 (complex). 
Degree of multinationality. (MULTI) This variable reports the number of countries in 
which the firm had directly invested in the period 1981-1985. This might capture for firm 
experience in dealing with international investments. So, we expect that the degree of 
multinationality has a positive effect on the probability that the project undertaken abroad is 
carried out through a wholly owned operation. 
RESULTS 
A first cut to the data 
We begin to explore our main hypotheses using simple tables. Although the "syncretic" 
theory (Hill, Hwang and Kim, 1990; Contractor, 1990) argues that country-specific, 
technology-specific and firm-specific variables should all be included in a unique multivariate 
analysis, parametric analysis imposes untestable restrictions on functional form. The 
following tables, however, indicate that the results we obtain from the formal regressions are 
robust to such functional form restrictions, and our logit analysis with multiple controls 
below, broadly confirms the results of the simple analysis carried out here. We present three 
tables capturing respectively the effects of cultural distance, country experience and the 
presence of multiple sources of technological competencies on the choice between wholly 
owned project and technology licensing. 
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The first table (Table 2) shows how larger cultural distance between home and host 
country makes less likely that a foreign project is carried out through a wholly owned 
operation rather than licensing. We have constructed five classes that are intended to capture 
for different levels of cultural distance. Classes broadly correspond to quintiles. Countries 
which are very similar in the Hofstede's four dimensions, like United States and Australia or 
Germany and Austria, enter in the first class labeled "Same culture". Countries which are 
very different in all four dimensions, like Japan and Morocco or Sweden and Japan, are in the 
"Opposite cultures" class. In the construction of the Classes we have also experimented 
different groupings with the results being robust to variations in the construction of the 
cultural distance classes. 
In this table we used the projects (both wholly owned projects and licensing) undertaken 
abroad in the whole period covered by our data set (1981-1991) for sixty countries for which 
we could measure cultural distance. This amounts to 3836 projects with a mean cultural 
distance of 1.601 and an average PI ("propensity to internalize") of 0.673. The last column of 
the table shows clearly that the PI decreases as the cultural distance between home and host 
country increases, indicating that increasing cultural distance favors licensing. 
Table 3 studies the effect of country experience on the decision between wholly owned 
project and technology licensing. We divide the observations in three groups. The first group 
includes all projects for which the firm has got no experience in the country in the preceding 
five years. The second group contains all projects for which the investor has accumulated 
some 'general' country experience, be it from licensing, joint ventures, wholly owned 
projects. The last group only considers the projects for which the firm has accumulated a 
more 'qualified' experiential learning through prior investments entailing greater involvement 
with the foreign country business environment such as joint ventures or wholly owned 
projects. 
The table reports projects (both wholly owned projects and licensing) undertaken 
abroad during the period 1986-1991. This is the time dimension we shall exploit in the logit 
regressions below. There are 2443 of such projects abroad in this period by the sample firms. 
The average PI is 0.61. Notice that the average PI is only 0.47 for projects in which the 
investor has not previous experience in the country, and rises to 0.68 for projects in which the 
investor has got some 'general' experience, and further to 0.83 when the firm has previously 
invested in a wholly owned project or joint venture. The table suggests that country-specific 
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experience makes future investments through wholly owned projects rather then licensing 
more likely, and this effect is more pronounced when the experiential learning comes from 
prior projects entailing greater involvement with the foreign country business environment. 
Moreover, this pattern seems to be persistent across different geographic areas. 
Table 4 studies the influence of the number of sources of technological competencies in 
a given process technology on the choice between wholly owned project and technology 
licensing. We construct six different classes ranging from no potential licensors to many. 
Although the construction of the classes is somewhat arbitrary, here too, experiments with 
different groupings show no significant changes in the results. The table reports all projects 
(wholly owned projects and licensing) undertaken abroad during the period 1986-91 by the 
firms of our sample. As expected, the PI is the largest when there are no potential licensors in 
a given process technology. The PI decreases as we move to classes with a larger number of 
potential licensors: Note also that the last column shows an increase in the PI. This points to 
the role of other factors, and the need to control for those factors through a multivariate 
regresSlOn. 
Logit analysis 
Table 5 reports means, standard deviations and correlations of our independent 
variables. The results of the binomial logit regressions are presented in Table 6. A positive 
coefficient means that the independent variable tends to increase the probability that a wholly 
owned project is set up, whereas a negative coefficient implies the opposite. We estimate 
four different model specifications. Model 1 and 2 only include the explanatory variables 
whose sign was predicted by the hypotheses we have worked out above. We used all projects 
undertaken abroad by the firms of our sample during the period 1986-1991 in the sixty 
countries for which the measure of cultural distance was available. For China, since the 
measure of cultural distance was missing we have used a dummy: DUMCHN. Model 1 and 2 
differ in the definition of country experience we have adopted. In the former, EXPALL 
measures experience as the number of projects (of whatever type) in a given country in the 
five years preceding the project under consideration. In the latter, EXPFDI only counts joint 
ventures and wholly owned projects. Model 3 and 4 still maintain the above mentioned 
difference in the measure of country experience, and add several control variables. In 
particular, as suggested by Kogut and Zander (1993), we have included controls for the nature 
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of the technology: CODIFIABILITY and COMPLEXITY. For this reason, we had to focus 
on a sub-set of 136 process technologies, for which we have been able to compute these two 
measures. We use other country-, firm- and technology-specific controls, to isolate the effect 
of our main explanatory variables from spurious sources of variation. We also estimated a 
fixed-effects logit specification controlling for firm fixed effects. The results, not reported 
here and available from the authors upon request, are qualitatively similar to the ones shown 
in Table 6. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that larger cultural distance increases the preference for licensing 
agreements. The parameter estimate of the effect of cultural distance (CULTDIST) is 
negative and highly significant in all specifications (p < 0.001 in all models). This supports 
Hypothesis 1. Notice also that DUMCHN is also negative and significant, implying that on 
average wholly owned projects are less likely to be set up in China. Interestingly enough, this 
effect remains after we control for other country characteristics like GDP, country risk, and 
openness to foreign direct investment (see model 3 and 4). 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms learn from previous expenence and this learning 
contributes to reduce the cost of a wholly owned project in a foreign country. Put differently, 
a firm is more willing to commit resources when it has previous experience in a given 
country. Whatever measure of experiential learning we use (EXPALL or EXPFDI) we find 
that the coefficient of the variable is positive and highly significant (p < 0.001), which 
confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 2. Further, the estimated coefficient of EXPFDI is 
larger than that of EXP ALL, with the marginal effect calculated at the means of the regressors 
being twice as large (0.015 versus 0.007 in models 3 and 4 respectively). In addition, models 
2 and 4 tit the data better than do models 1 and 3 respectively. This supports Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that a larger number of potential licensors makes more difficult 
to recover the cost of the investment since entry by competitors is more likely (there is no 
exclusivity in the technological competencies). In turn, this implies that when the number of 
potential licensors is large, a firm prefers to use technology licensing rather than setting up a 
wholly owned project. Consistent with Hypotheses 4, the coefficient of the logarithm of the 
number of potential licensors (LPOTLIC) is negative and highly significant (p < 0.001). 
Either using a quadratic term or simply using the variable POTLIC give a similar result in 
terms of the predicted effect of the number of potential licensors. 
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Finally, in model 3 and 4 we have controlled for many different sources of 
heterogeneity in our data. In particular, we have tried to control to our best for the nature of 
technology, which has been identified by Kogut and Zander (1993) as one of the main 
determinants of the choice between licensing and wholly owned subsidiary. In addition, as 
discussed above, this allows us to be much more confident about the true effect of LPOTLlC. 
Indeed, both for CODIFIABILlTY and for COMPLEXITY we obtain the expected sign and a 
high level of significance. Similar to Kogut and Zander (1993), our results suggest that 
technologies with a greater tacit component and those that are complex are more difficult to 
transfer through market-based transactions. 
The signs of the other variables are reasonable. The fact that home and host country are 
located close one to the other and that they have the same language increases the odds that the 
project is carried out through wholly owned operation rather than licensing. The total 
turnover of the firm (SIZE) does not have any significant effect, and neither does the 
international experience of the investor (MULTI), whereas the results indicate that firms are 
less likely to license core technologies. GDP has a small negative effect on the probability of 
observing a wholly owned project, indicating that the large market benefits of the value of 
learning does not fully balance the availability of suitable licensees and the increased 
toughness of competition. Instead, economic, financial and political risks and barriers on 
capital investments and intermediate goods, increase the probability of licensing. 
Multinomial logit and ordered logit 
As an extension to the analysis carried out so far, we also perform multinomial logit and 
ordered logit regressions (see Greene, 1993). Hitherto, joint ventures were excluded from our 
analysis. However, our database reports if a plant is operated by more than one firm. We use 
this information to identify a joint venture as an entry mode separate from licensing and 
wholly owned project. We have therefore three possible entry modal choices: wholly owned 
project (M=l), joint venture (M=2) and technology licensing (M=3). We first estimate a 
multinomiallogit specification where we use all control variables described above. We again 
differentiate between the two types of experiential learning: EXPALL and EXPFDI (see 
model 5 and 6). 
It seems natural to rank the three alternatives in terms of the implicit governance 
structures as lying on a continuum between a hierarchy and a market mechanism (e.g., Hill, 
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Hwang and Kim, 1990; Contractor and Kundu, 1998). This suggests that an ordered logit 
regression might be appropriate, and we use an ordered logit to estimate model 7 and 8, which 
again differ only in how we measure country experience. We code the three modes, wholly 
owned project, joint venture, and licensing as 1, 2, and 3 respectively, with a higher rank 
indicating an entry mode closer to a market. For the interpretation of the results, recall that in 
the multinomiallogit, a posit sign means that the variable increases the likelihood of the entry 
mode under consideration compared to the reference mode (wholly owned project), while in 
the ordered logit a positive sign implies that the variable increases the probability of entry 
modes of higher rank - i.e., of modes closer to markets and farther from hierarchies. 
Overall, the results are consistent with those in Table 6, with joint ventures appearing as 
an intermediate case between wholly owned project and licensing. There are, however, a 
couple of anomalous results. First, in the multinomial logit regressions, country experience -
either EXP ALL or EXPFDI, reduces the odds of licensing, but increases those of a joint 
venture vis-a-vis wholly owned project. This might suggest that experiential learning is more 
important when the investor has to share the control of the foreign project with a local partner 
rather than when she has full control over the foreign operation. Simply put, learning seems 
to be a crucial determinant for the likely success of cooperative ventures, alliances and 
strategic coordination with local partners. Second, all technology-specific variables do not 
affect the choice between a wholly owned project and a joint venture, but do affect the choice 
between these and licensing. An interesting explanation is that there is no qualitative 
difference in the knowledge transferred through wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures, 
and that joint ventures may be used as well to transfer knowledge that is organizationally 
embedded and difficult to transfer by licensing (Kogut, 1988). Finally, the results of the 
ordered logit specification go in the same direction as our results in Table 6, implying that 
ranking the three alternatives by their implied governance structure is sensible. 
CONCLUSION 
This study offers some fresh evidence on a crucial strategic decision by firms involved 
in global competition: when is licensing better than a wholly owned subsidiary for exploiting 
technological competencies abroad? This paper adds to the somewhat sparse empirical 
literature on this topic (Contractor, 1984; Davidson and McFetridge, 1984; Contractor and 
Kundu, 1998). We use a new database that covers all chemical plants constructed or under 
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construction worldwide during the 1980s. We develop a sample of the overseas investments 
and licenses of the largest 153 chemical firms in the world. Although confined to one 
industry, our data set is rich and comprehensive. In addition, we believe that the results from 
the chemical industry should provide insight into other scale and technology intensive 
industries. Another strength of our analysis comes from the large number of firms' 
nationality included in our sample. This is not typically the case in many other studies in the 
field of international business, which often rely on data from a single country. By focusing on 
an industry, we can better control for differences in technology characteristics, such as 
codifiability and complexity, which is much more difficult in cross-industry studies. Finally, 
another important contribution of this paper is the analysis of the role of competition, 
especially in the market for technology, in conditioning the choice of the mode of entry. 
We find that cultural barriers are an important limitation to the commitment of 
resources. Firms prefer to exploit their technological competencies through licensing when 
the target country is culturally far away from the home country. Geographic distance and 
difference in language favor the use of licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad as well, 
suggesting that communication, control and coordination are important at the international 
level, and that firms move to distant countries gradually and only after having established a 
presence in more proximate countries (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Our results also support the idea that learning plays a crucial role in the design of 
internationalization strategies. We find that prior experience in the host country increases the 
odds that the project is carried out through a wholly owned operation rather than licensing. 
Results also confirm that this experience is more valuable when it comes from prior projects 
which entail a greater degree of involvement with the foreign business environment such as 
joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Our results imply that firms need to explore both licensing and wholly owned operation 
as means of exploiting their technological capabilities to full effect. In so doing, they must 
take into account factors, such as cultural distance and the nature of technology, that affect the 
cost of technology transfer through contract based mechanisms such as licensing. Our results 
also shed light on a research question that has been little explored empirically. Although it is 
widely accepted that a firm's expansion strategy cannot be analyzed in isolation, empirical 
studies on entry modes have typically ignored this point. We find that the presence of other 
sources of technological competencies favors the use of licensing vis-a-vis wholly owned 
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projects. This is consistent with the idea that when the technological competencies the firm 
possesses are not unique, entry in the market is more likely. In turn, this implies that a firm 
might instead opt for a licensing strategy, which is less demanding in terms of resources and 
commitment. 
As a byproduct, this paper confirms the finding in Kogut and Zander (1993), namely 
that the nature of teclmology plays a critical role in the choice of the internationalization 
strategy of the technology holder. Indeed, we find that codifiability of technology encourages 
licensing. By contrast, technologies with a greater tacit component and those that are more 
complex tend to be transferred through internal rather than market-based transactions. 
NOTES 
1. The chemical industry, which we study here, has been a global industry for many 
years. In 1994 the book value of foreign direct investments in the US was $61.3 billion, 
compared to $51.6 billion of US investment in foreign chemical companies. A great deal of 
international trade consists of intra-firm transactions of such companies. In 1994 US 
chemical company parents exports amounted to $51.5 billion, of which over two thirds went 
to their foreign affiliates. Likewise, 56% of the US chemical imports were channeled through 
the US affiliates of foreign companies. International technology flows, which are often 
related to capital, are also significant. In 1993 US companies received $2.3 billion in 
royalties and licensing fees and paid $1.2 billion. (All figures taken from the Chemical 
Manufacturing Associati.on, 1994). 
2. It is worth noting that often discussions of learning tend to blend the information 
gathering and adaptation. Put differently, a firm may learn about a country's institutions and 
practices and decide not to proceed any further. This notion is related to the recently 
developed literature on the theory of "real options". (See Dixit and Pindyk, 1994). According 
to this theory, firms may treat their initial forays into a country as an opportunity to learn in 
order to lead to a better informed decision on whether to expand further in that country. 
These considerations are not directly relevant for our study because we examine the choice of 
the mode of the entry, conditional on the firm having decided to enter. 
3. The sample includes 68 American or Canadian firms, 32 Japanese and 53 West 
European firms. Also, notice that some of these firms were not actively investing or licensing 
abroad during the period under study. 
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4. This estimate is computed using the average cost of investment in a given chemical 
project, which is about (current) $100 million. Counting both direct investments, joint-
ventures and licensing, our data set reports a little more than 5000 projects abroad for the 
firms of the sample during the period under study. 
5. We selected all relevant patents using a keyword search with the process as keyword. 
From these, we selected and read the full abstracts of patents that exactly fit our criterion. 
The patent classes (and sub-classes) into which these patents were classified were examined 
to ensure that the invention was in fact a process technology invention. These sub-classes of 
the US patent classification system were used along with the process name as the basis for 
Boolean queries of the US patent database to generate the final set of patents, one set for each 
technology. (The details of the Boolean queries are available upon request.) The titles (and 
some abstracts selected at random) of the patents in the final sample for each technology were 
examined to ensure that the final sample did not contain irrelevant patents. 
6. Both the variable CODIFIABILITY and the variable COMPLEXITY have been 
standardized according with the following formula: (x - Xlllin)/(Xlllax - Xlllin), where x is the 
original variable and Xlllax and Xlllin the maximum and minimum values it takes across all 136 
technologies. 
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TABLE 1: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN ABROAD BY THE FIRMS OF 
THE SAMPLE 
Period Entry NA WE JAP First AF,ME SA FE Third Total 
Mode World and EE World 
1981- WOP 396 456 38 890 51 152 174 377 1267 
1985 LIC 71 141 54 266 235 51 186 472 738 
1986- WOP 487 605 46 1138 50 121 251 422 1560 
1991 LIC 74 161 53 288 235 110 327 672 960 
1981- WOP 1028 1363 191 2582 571 434 938 1943 4525 
1991 +LIC 
Note: WOP - Wholly Owned ProJect, LIC - Licensed ProJect; NA - North Amenca, WE - Western Europe, 
lAP = Japan, AF = Africa, ME = Middle East, EE = Eastern Europe, FE = Far East. 
TABLE 2: CULTURAL DISTANCE AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN WHOLLY OWNED PROJECT AND 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 
How different are home CULTDIFF Number of % of total PI 
and host country cultures? projects projects 
Same culture [0,0.25) 766 20 0.838 
Close cultures [0.25, 1) 713 19 0.780 
Not very close cultures [1, 2) 918 24 0.655 
Different cultures [2,3) 775 20 0.555 
Opposite cultures [3,00) 664 17 0.491 
1.601 3836 100 0.673 
TABLE 3: COUNTRY EXPERIENCE AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN WHOLLY OWNED PROJECT AND 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 
Geographic PI: no N.of PI: 'general' N. of PI: 'qualified' N. of 
Area country projects .country projects country projects 
experience (86-91) experience (86-91) experience (86-91) 
North 0.679 53 0.886 502 0.909 485 
America 
Western 0.720 229 0.810 508 0.896 441 
Europe 
Asia and 0.403 258 0.432 396 0.633 237 
Japan 
Rest of the 0.297 265 0.336 232 0.618 110 
World 
World 0.471 805 0.675 1638 0.828 1273 
TABLE 4: POTENTIAL LICENSORS AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN WHOLLY OWNED PROJECT AND 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 
Number of Potential Licensors (POTLIC) 
0 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-15 >15 All 
PI 0.829 0.719 0.651 0.527 0.394 0.507 0.607 
# of projects 485 352 404 385 452 365 2443 
% of projects 20 14 17 16 18 15 100 
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TABLE 6: 
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2. Regressions in model 1 and 2 include the following sector dummies: Air Separation, Fertilizers, Gas 
Handling. Inorganic Chemicals, Industrial Gasses, Inorganic Chemicals, Oil Refining, Plastics, 
Petrochemicals, Textile and Fibers. 















































































































































































































































I. In model 5 and 6, M=I is the comparison group (wholly owned project). In models 7 and 8, intercepts 1 and 
2 are respectively -1.701 (0.491), -0.9042 (0.489) and -1.763 (0.492), -0.952 (0.490). 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
3. +p<0.I,*p<0.05, "p<O.Ol, "'p<O.OOl 
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TABLE 5: 
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIA nONS, AND CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
I. CULTDlST 1.673 0.499 1.00 
2. DUMCHN 0.066 0.248 -0.32 1.00 
3. POTLIC 10.380 6.000 0.07 0.01 1.00 
4. EXPALL 5.960 11.47 -0.33 -0.08 -0.07 1.00 
5. EXPFDl 4.865 10.34 -0.33 -0.12 -0.07 0.99 1.00 
6. PROXIMITY 0.176 0.381 -0.22 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
7. LANGUAGE 0.232 0.422 -0.46 -0.15 -0.06 0.37 0.38 0.22 1.00 
8. GOP 971.1 1272 -0.35 0.20 -0.07 0.58 0.56 -0.16 0.12 1.00 
9.0WTI 0.145 0.276 0.07 0.10 0.08 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 0.06 -0.12 1.00 
10. NORISK 74.80 16.29 -0.36 -0.07 -0.06 0.35 0.36 0.19 0.29 0.43 -0.44 1.00 
11. SIZE 8414 6833 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.20 0.21 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.03 1.00 
12. MULTI 8.895 5.640 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 0.38 0.38 -0.09 0.208 0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.66 1.00 
13. CORE 0.251 0.434 -0.01 -0.04 0.21 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.07 -0.22 -0.10 1.00 
14. CODIFIABILITY 0.707 0.166 -0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.15 -0.02 0.15 1.00 
15. COMPLEXITY 0.605 0.123 0.05 -0.05 0.18 -0.09 -0.10 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.11 0.24 0.25 1.00 
Note: Number of observatIOns - 1388. 
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